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COMMENTS
WHAT CAN RICO NOT DO?: RICO AND
THE NON-ECONOMIC INTRASTATE




The First and Sixth Circuits Courts of Appeal have split on whether
§ 1962(c) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
requires the Government to prove substantial effects on interstate
commerce where the defendant commits non-economic racketeering activity
and is associated with a non-economic intrastate enterprise. This Comment
concludes that while requiring substantial effects on interstate commerce
represents a jurisprudential sea change, federal courts should employ a
more stringent standard to determine whether an enterprise or the
defendant's racketeering activity affects interstate commerce. This
Comment also visits the First Circuit Court of Appeals' erroneous
application of the principles set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in
Gonzales v. Raich to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, and discusses the potential impact of Raich on future RICO decisions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Jackson Nascimento belonged to a local street gang that claimed
territory on the south side of Boston, Massachusetts.' The gang operated
exclusively in that area and did not actively participate in economic
J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2009; B.A., B.B.A.,
University of Notre Dame, 2005. Tremendous thanks to all who assisted me in completing
this Comment. Also, many thanks to my friends, family, and, especially, Lauren Goodwin
for all the support and well wishes throughout my law school career.
1 United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2007).
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activity.' For several years, Nascimento's gang waged a murderous war
against a similarly local street gang. In 2005, Jackson Nascimento was
convicted of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy in violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).4 He was
sentenced to 171 months in federal prison. In support of the racketeering
conviction, the jury found that Nascimento shot and killed one member of
the rival street gang and conspired to kill many others.6 These crimes were
violent but non-economic in nature.
RICO is one of the federal government's most sweeping criminal
laws.7 It is aimed at the commercial effects of enterprise criminality,' but
can be used to prosecute non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by
individuals, like Nascimento, who are associated with non-economic
intrastate enterprises. 9
The Supreme Court of the United States addressed the scope of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause to regulate non-economic
intrastate criminal activity in United States v. Lopez,'0 United States v.
Morrison,"I and Gonzales v. Raich.12 Lopez and Morrison stand for the
principle that Congress cannot regulate local, non-economic, violent
criminal activity unless it has substantial effects on interstate commerce.
3
In Raich, the Court held that Congress may regulate non-economic
intrastate activity as an essential part of a larger and valid regulatory
scheme so long as there is a rational basis for so doing.' 4 The impact of
these decisions on federal criminal law is hotly debated,' 5 but commentators
2 Id. at 30.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 31.
5 id.
6 id.
7 Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
68 (2006)); see Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO
Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1990).
8 G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That Bolster Efforts to
Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the End of
RICO? ", 43 VAND. L. REv. 851, 866 (1990).
9 See Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25.
10 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
11529 U.S. 598 (2000).
12545 U.S. 1 (2005).
13 See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
14 See Raich, 545 U.S. 1.
15 See Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605 (2001); Tara M.
Stuckey, Note, Jurisdictional Hooks in the Wake of Raich: On Properly Interpreting Federal
Regulations of Interstate Commerce, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2101 (2006); Andrew Weis,
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generally agree that prosecutions under major criminal statutes, like RICO,
have not slowed.
16
The Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
however, has had some effect on RICO's enforcement. Two federal circuit
courts recently split over whether RICO's jurisdictional element requires
the Government to prove substantial effects on interstate commerce where
the defendant, associated with a non-economic intrastate enterprise,
commits only non-economic "racketeering activity." In Waucaush v.
United States, the Sixth Circuit held that RICO's jurisdictional element
required the Government to demonstrate substantial effects on interstate
commerce to prosecute an individual, associated with a non-economic
intrastate enterprise, accused of only non-economic racketeering activity.
17
In United States v. Nascimento, the First Circuit diverged from that opinion
and held that RICO's jurisdictional element required proof of only a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce. 8 In the same case, the First Circuit
analyzed RICO under the principles set forth in Raich-an analysis that
may subjugate the role of RICO's jurisdictional element altogether.' 9
This Comment will discuss these two important and related issues.
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of RICO's original design
and subsequent application. Part III addresses RICO's jurisdictional
element and whether it requires that non-economic racketeering activity
perpetrated by individuals associated with non-economic intrastate
enterprises substantially affect interstate commerce or only affect interstate
commerce. Part III is divided into several sections. Section 1 describes
§ 1962(c) of RICO, its text, important terms, liberal construction, and
potential reach.2° Section 2 examines Lopez and Morrison to elucidate the
scope of Congress's commerce power. Section 3 examines the Sixth and
First Circuits' split in Waucaush and Nascimento, respectively. Section 4
Note, Commerce Clause in the Cross-Hairs: The Use of Lopez-Based Motions to Challenge
the Constitutionality of Federal Criminal Statutes, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1431 (1996).
16 Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 573,
574-75 (2004) ("The key question was, and remains, what impact these cases will have on
prosecutions under other statutes that have been used successfully by the federal government
to prosecute its core concerns .... Surprisingly, the nearly unanimous answer from the
federal courts to date is: 'No Impact!.').
17 380 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2004).
is 491 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2007).
19 See id. at 41-42; Stuckey, supra note 15 (discussing the implications of Raich for
federal criminal statutes that contain jurisdictional elements).
20 The application of § 1962(c) to non-economic, criminal enterprises perpetrating non-
economic "racketeering activity" is the focus of this Comment. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
Any reference to violating RICO, prosecuting a RICO violation, or applying RICO is a
reference to § 1962(c).
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explores what evidentiary standard the federal courts should require.
Though this Comment recognizes that requiring substantial effects on
interstate commerce would be a jurisprudential sea change, it ultimately
concludes that the affecting commerce standard should mean more than a
speculative or incidental effect on interstate commerce. Non-economic
racketeering activity perpetrated by individuals associated with non-
economic intrastate enterprises should fall outside RICO. Part IV examines
what impact the Supreme Court's holding in Raich will have on RICO's
jurisdictional element. Part IV is also divided into several sections. Section
1 examines the Supreme Court's holding in Raich. Section 2 discusses the
implications of applying Raich's holding to § 1962(c) of RICO. Section 3
concludes that the First Circuit erred in its holding, and argues that because
non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by an individual associated
with a non-economic intrastate enterprise is separate and distinct from the
class of activity regulated by RICO, there is no rational basis for
incorporating it into RICO's larger regulatory scheme.
II. BACKGROUND
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, known
generally as RICO, is Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act.
2'
Generated amidst public fear over the perceived strength of organized
22crime, RICO's stated purpose is to "seek the eradication of organized
crime.., by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process,
by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those
engaged in organized crime. 23  As drafted, however, RICO's broad
statutory language reaches all types of "enterprise criminality. 24 Enterprise
criminality encompasses a wide range of criminal activity and has been
defined as "'patterns' of violence, the provision of illegal goods and
services, corruption in the labor or management relations, corruption in
government, and criminal fraud by, through, or against various types of licit
or illicit 'enterprises.'
' 25
In furtherance of its broad language, RICO commands that it be
liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.26 Since 1970, RICO
21 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006); Blakey & Perry, supra note 8, at 853.
22 Craig M. Bradley, Anti-Racketeering Legislation in America, 54 AM. J. CoMp. L. 671,
686-88 (2006).
23 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
24 Blakey & Perry, supra note 8, at 866.
25 G. Robert Blakey & John Robert Blakey, Civil and Criminal RICO: An Overview of
the Statute and Its Operation, 64 DEF. COuNS. J. 36, 36 (1997).
26 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 § 904, 84 Stat. at 947.
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has been used to prosecute many crimes beyond classic organized crime,
including political corruption and other white collar crimes.27
III. RICO's JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
A. SECTION 1962(C) OF RICO
Section 1962(c) of RICO states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful 
debt. 2 8
To successfully prosecute a RICO charge, the Government must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that: "'(1) an enterprise existed; (2) the
enterprise participated in or its activities affected interstate commerce; (3)
the defendant was employed by or was associated with the enterprise; (4)
the defendant conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise; (5)
through a pattern of racketeering activity.'
29
Like the rest of RICO, § 1962(c) contains broad terms.30 Enterprise
and racketeering activity, defined in § 1961(1) and (4) of RICO, are
generous in scope. 31 "[A]ny individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity" can constitute a RICO
32
enterprise. Federal courts have a significant amount of discretion in
recognizing a RICO enterprise.33 There is no rigid standard that must be
satisfied.3 4 Minimally, a RICO enterprise must be an ongoing organization,
formal or informal, whose associates operate as a continuous unit.35  A
RICO enterprise can be a legitimate or illegitimate organization,36 and need
27 Blakey & Blakey, supra note 25, at 42.
28 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
29 United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
30 See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983).
"' 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (4) (2006).
32 Id. § 1961(4). For an explanation of the several judicially created standards to
determine RICO's vertical reach within an organization, see Scott Paccagnini, How Low Can
You Go (Down the Ladder): The Vertical Reach of RICO, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1 (2003).
33 See Ross Bagley et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 44 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 901, 911 (2007).
34 See id. (citing United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(recognizing the fluid nature of criminal organizations and the need for a shifting definition
of "enterprise")).
35 United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).




not be economically motivated.37 The Government can establish a RICO
enterprise by providing evidence of some decision-making structure or
cohesion within a group.38  RICO has been used to prosecute defendants
associated with a variety of different enterprises. 39  Courts have found
marriages, schools, labor unions, and even county prosecutors' offices to be
RICO enterprises.40
The definition of "racketeering activity" is almost as broad.
Racketeering activity is a sweeping term that is defined by over sixty
different crimes,41  including nine state crimes and fifty-two federal
42crimes. The nine state crimes are any act or threat of murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in narcotics, or dealing
in an obscene matter.43  Some of the fifty-two federal crimes involve
embezzlement from pension and welfare funds, wire fraud, the trafficking
in persons, and "white slave" traffic.44 For the Government to successfully
prosecute a substantive RICO charge under § 1962(c), the trier of fact must
conclude that the defendant is guilty of "a pattern of racketeering
activity. 4 5  In other words, the trier of fact must conclude that the
46defendant committed at least two crimes that define racketeering activity.
Racketeering activity is a unique crime. Though related, it is separate
and distinct from its many predicate acts.4 7 The predicate acts are referred
to in RICO for definitional purposes only. 48 RICO does not criminalize the
37 Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 252 (1994) ("We hold that
RICO requires no such economic motive.").
38 See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v.
Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1223 (9th Cir. 2004).
38 United States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1991).
39 See Bagley et al., supra note 33, at 912-13.
41 See id.




41 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2006).
46 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Two predicate acts are necessary, but not sufficient, to prove the
pattern element in § 1962(c). There must also be proof of relatedness and continuity
between the predicate acts. United States v. Fernandez, 388 F.3d 1199, 1221 n.1 1 (9th Cir.
2004) (citing H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1989)); see also
United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) ("A sufficient nexus or relationship
exists between the racketeering acts and the enterprise if the defendant was able to commit
the predicate acts by means of, by consequence of, by reason of, by the agency of, or by the
instrumentality of his association with the enterprise.").
47 See United States v. Forsythe, 560 F.2d 1127, 1135 (3rd Cir. 1977) ("State law
offenses are not the gravamen of RICO offenses."); see also Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The
Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts Ill & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 920,923 (1987).
48 United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1047 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States
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predicate acts per se,49 but rather, the impact they have on interstate
commerce in furtherance of enterprise criminality. 50 Because the crimes are
different, a charge of racketeering activity will survive even if the defendant
was previously acquitted of the predicate acts. 51 If a defendant is convicted
under § 1962(c), RICO calls for a prison sentence of up to twenty years, or,
if authorized by the predicate act, a term sentence of life in prison. 2
B. RECENT COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court recently addressed the scope of Congress's
commerce power in three landmark decisions. Because Congress enacted
RICO with its power to regulate interstate commerce, these holdings may
dictate how § 1962(c) of RICO is ultimately applied to non-economic
intrastate enterprises whose associates commit only non-economic
racketeering activity.
For the first time in nearly sixty years, the Supreme Court ruled that
Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in United States
v. Lopez.53  The case involved § 922(q)(1)(A) of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990. 54  This federal statute criminalized the knowing
possession of a firearm within one thousand feet of a school.55  After a
lengthy discussion of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a slim majority, identified three broad categories of
activities that fall within Congress's commerce power.56 First, Congress
may regulate the channels of interstate commerce.57 Second, Congress may
regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. 58 Third, Congress
may regulate those activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.59 The Court analyzed the statute under this third prong and
struck it down.60
v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274, 286 (7th Cir. 1971)).
49 Id. (quoting Cerone, 452 F.2d at 286).
51 Forsythe, 560 F.2d at 1135.
51 See Licavoli, 725 F.2d at 1047; see also Bagley et al., supra note 33, at 923-24; Teresa
Bryan et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 987,
991 (2003).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2006).
" 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995); see Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and
Federalism After Lopez and Morrison: The Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element
Loophole, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1675, 1677 (2002).
14 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
55 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)).
56 Id. at 558-59.
" Id. at 558.
58 Id.
'9 Id. at 558-59. The Court noted that within this final category, the case law was not
2009]
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In the eyes of the Court, § 922(q)(1)(A) failed to meet the "substantial
effects" test for three reasons. First, the Court noted that the criminal
statute had nothing to do with commerce or economic activity, and that it
was not an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme.6' Therefore, the
statute could not be sustained as a regulation of activities that, considered
together, substantially affected interstate commerce.62 Second, the majority
observed that the statute contained "no jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in
question- affects interstate commerce. 63  Though not dispositive, a
jurisdictional element would support the argument that the regulated
64firearms had the appropriate connection to interstate commerce. 4 Finally,
though not required to do so, Congress had not made formal findings as to
how the regulated activity substantially affected interstate commerce.65 The
absence of these findings made it more difficult for the Court to conclude
that the knowing possession of a firearm within one thousand feet of a
school substantially affected interstate commerce.66
To support the statute's constitutionality, the Government argued that
possession of a firearm in a school zone might lead to violent crime, and
that violent crime substantially affected interstate commerce because it
placed a serious burden on the tourism and insurance industries. 67  The
Govemment also argued that gun possession in a school zone posed a
substantial threat to the educational process and, in turn, interstate
commerce. 68 The majority rejected both lines of reasoning.69 The Court
noted that if it were to accept these arguments, it would be "hard pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress [was] without power to
regulate. 70
clear whether an activity must "affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce. Id. at
559. The Court concluded that the proper test was whether a regulated activity
"substantially affects" interstate commerce. Id.
60 Id. at 551.
61 Id. at 561.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 561-62.
65 Id. at 562-63.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 563-64. The Court referred to these arguments as "cost of crime" and "national
productivity." Id. at 563.
68 Id. at 564.
69 Id.
70 Id. This includes activities with respect to family law or education, areas traditionally
regulated by the states. Id.
[Vol. 99
WHAT CAN RICO NOT DO?
Without overruling precedent, the Court declined to extend Congress's
commerce power any further.71  The Court was very concerned with
maintaining the distinction between what is truly national and what is truly
local.72 It refused "to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a
general police power of the sort retained by the States. 73
Five years after Lopez, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
United States v. Morrison.74 The case involved § 13981 of the Violence
Against Women Act.75 Under this statute, a person who committed a crime
of violence motivated by gender was civilly liable to the party injured.76
Though § 13981 did not contain a jurisdictional element, it was supported
by voluminous congressional findings regarding the regulated activity's
substantial effects on interstate commerce.77 Despite this, the Court
invalidated it as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce
power.78
In so doing, the majority reiterated that the existence of Congressional
findings as to an activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce, alone,
is insufficient to uphold the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation.79 Whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce
is a question to be finally answered by the Court.80 The Court also
addressed the "cost of crime" reasoning that the Government had previously
put forth in Lopez and again rejected it. 8' That reasoning, the Court
believed, would enable Congress to regulate any crime so long as its
aggregate commercial impact had "substantial effects on employment,
production, transit, or consumption., 82  Ultimately, the Court held that
Congress may not "regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based
solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.', 83 The
Court could "think of no better example of the police power, which the
71 Id. at 566-67.
72 Id. at 567-68.
71 Id. at 567.
74 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
71 Id. at 601.
76 Id. at 605 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1398(c)).
77 Id. at 614.
78 Id. at 617-18.
79 Id. at 614.
8o Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)).
81 Id. at 615.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 617.
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Founders denied the National Government and reposed in the States, than
the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.
' 4
In dissent, Justice Breyer criticized the economic activity versus non-
economic violent crime distinction as being unworkable. Justice Breyer
emphasized his point by highlighting the economic grey area in which so
many crimes reside: "Does the local street comer mugger engage in
'economic' activity or 'non-economic' activity when he mugs for
money? ' 8 6  He was also troubled by the fortuitous or back door
constitutionality that might result from strategic statutory drafting.
Recognizing that Congress could regulate a purely intrastate activity that
was an essential part of a larger regulatory scheme, he pondered whether
Congress could save § 13981 by including it in a broader, more
comprehensive regulation.87 The Supreme Court has not since answered
those questions.
The Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison firmly established that
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce is an enumerated power 
8
and not a plenary power.8 9 Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause has judicially enforceable outer limits, 90 the precise contours of
which remain unclear.9' Notwithstanding this uncertainty, all nine justices
on the Supreme Court agreed that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress is
not empowered to regulate every activity. 92 Even in light of an increasingly
connected and national economy, not everything can qualify as commerce. 93
C. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Because of these principles, § 1962(c) of RICO presents a unique
constitutional quandary. Racketeering activity, as a general class of
activity, is not limited to or characterized by one type of crime. 94 Though
distinct, the individual predicate acts that constitute racketeering activity
84 Id. at 618 ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at
the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been
the province of the States.").
85 Id. at 656 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 657.
88 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
89 Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: An
Evolutionary Court or Revolutionary Court?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 795, 834 (2003).
90 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566.
91 Id.; Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez: Another Look at
Federal Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61,62 (1997).
92 Rotunda, supra note 89, at 836.
93 Id.
94 See United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
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represent an eclectic mix of economic crimes and non-economic crimes. 95
This is especially true with respect to the nine state crimes it encompasses.
Extortion, gambling, dealing in narcotics, and dealing in an obscene matter
are all crimes of a commercial nature.96 Murder, on the other hand, is not.97
According to Lopez and Morrison, murder, per se, falls outside the scope of
Congress's commerce power because it does not substantially affect
interstate commerce. 98 Congress cannot regulate an individual instance of
murder merely because it, in some strained way, affects commerce. 99
According to § 1962(c), however, an individual instance of
racketeering activity and the activities of the enterprise at issue need not
substantially affect interstate commerce.100 RICO's jurisdictional element
only requires an effect on interstate commerce. 101  Affecting interstate
commerce implies a very minimal nexus between the racketeering activity
or enterprise and interstate commerce. 0 2 Thus, under RICO, an individual
who commits racketeering activity predicated solely on murder, and who is
associated with a non-economic intrastate enterprise, may be prosecuted
when that activity or enterprise has only a minimal effect on interstate
commerce. This conundrum faced the First and Sixth Circuits in Waucaush
v. United States'0 3 and United States v. Nascimento,10 4 respectively. The
circuits split over whether non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated
95 Compare Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (affirming petitioner's
conviction for perpetrating intrastate, extortionate credit transactions and confirming the
impact of that conduct on interstate commerce), with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (characterizing traditional, local, violent crime, like gender-motivated, violent
crime, as non-economic in nature).
96 See Lynch, supra note 47, at 923. With its power to regulate interstate commerce,
Congress has enacted legislation that makes each crime, independently, a federal offense.
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2006) (prohibiting sports bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006)
(prohibiting the destruction by fire or explosion of buildings or property used in any activity
affecting interstate or foreign commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006) (prohibiting extortion or
robbery that affects interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2006) (prohibiting illegal
gambling businesses); 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006) (prohibiting the manufacture or possession
of child pornography produced with materials that have passed through interstate
commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2006) (prohibiting the interstate transportation of stolen
property valued in excess of $5000); 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-970 (2006) (prohibiting manufacture,
possession, and distribution of narcotics).
97 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 18 U.S.C.S. § 1962(c) (2006) (requiring that the racketeering activity or enterprise
only affect interstate commerce).
101 United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1997).
102 Id. at 1348-49.
103 380 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2004).
10' 491 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
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by individuals associated with non-economic intrastate enterprises must
substantially affect interstate commerce or only affect interstate commerce.
1. Waucaush v. United States
In Waucaush v. United States, the Sixth Circuit held that non-
economic racketeering activity perpetrated by an individual associated with
a non-economic intrastate enterprise must substantially affect interstate
commerce. 0 5 The case involved the Cash Flow Posse (CFP), a Detroit area
street gang whose membership did not extend beyond the city's limits.
10 6
Petitioner Robert Waucaush was a member of CFP.10 7 He and his cohorts
allegedly murdered and conspired to murder members of at least two rival
street gangs to expand CFP's territory.108 Their crimes did not cross state
lines or impede any economic organization, and were not committed to
advance any economic interest.10 9 CFP's criminal enterprise was territorial
only. The court characterized its crimes as "violence qua violence." 1 0
CFP was not involved in drug trafficking, extortion, or gambling. 11
Additionally, no evidence was presented to show that CFP actively engaged
in interstate commerce, and no evidence was presented to show that its
targeted victims did either. 1
2
Waucaush pled guilty to conspiring to violate RICO, but appealed his
conviction and sentence. 1 3 Waucaush argued that he did not violate RICO,
and that his guilty plea was null and void, because his racketeering activity
and the activities of CFP did not substantially affect interstate commerce.114
The Sixth Circuit had previously held that a de minimis effect on
interstate commerce satisfied RICO's jurisdictional element where the
defendant's predicate acts were commercial in nature or the enterprise at
issue engaged in economic activity. 15 On these facts, however, the court
thought it inappropriate to apply the de minimis standard. 1 6 CFP did not
engage in economic activity and was, therefore, distinct from those
05 Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 256-57.
106 Id. at 253. The Government argued that CFP "eventually became associated with a
national gang," but the record did not contain supporting evidence. Id. at 257.
107 Id. at 253.
1o Id.
"09 Id. at 256.
110 Id.
.i Id. at 257.
112 Id. at 256-57.
"13 Id. at 254.
'14 Id. at 258.
"' Id. at 255-56 (citing United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2001)).
116 Id. at 256.
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enterprises involved in earlier RICO cases. 1 7 Relying on Morrison, the
court noted that Congress may not regulate non-economic violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate' effect on interstate
commerce. 118 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that where the enterprise itself
did not engage in economic activity, the Government would have to show a
substantial effect on interstate commerce to successfully prosecute a RICO
violation. 19
The Sixth Circuit concluded that CFP was a completely intrastate, non-
economic violent criminal enterprise that did not produce substantial effects
on interstate commerce.1 20  The court conceded that CFP's activities did
affect interstate commerce in some strained way, but these effects were too
attenuated to survive constitutional scrutiny. 121 The court believed that to
apply RICO to CFP and other similar enterprises would obliterate the
distinction between national and local criminal conduct.1
22
The Sixth Circuit decided Waucaush v. United States before the
Supreme Court decided Gonzales v. Raich. It did not prophetically address
the issues raised or analytical methods used in Raich. Rather, the court
focused on the enterprise's effects on interstate commerce and RICO's
jurisdictional element. The Sixth Circuit tried to reconcile its own
precedent with the then-recent Supreme Court opinions in Lopez, Morrison,
and Jones v. United States.'23 In so doing, the Sixth Circuit decided to
interpret and apply RICO's affecting-commerce language differently
depending on the type of enterprise involved. 
124
Also, the Sixth Circuit did not address whether CFP had a de minimis
effect on interstate commerce. The de minimis standard would have
required CFP to have only a minimal effect on interstate commerce. The
court's discussion indicated the record was void of evidence that linked
CFP to interstate commerce. Why the court did not simply rule that CFP
lacked a de minimis effect on interstate commerce and was, therefore,
outside the reach of RICO is unclear. One must conclude that the evidence
117 Id.
18 Id. at 256 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000)).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 258. The Government argued that CFP's criminal conduct had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce because it prevented the murdered rival gang members from
selling drugs. Id. at 256. The court did not find sufficient evidence in the record to support
that contention, however. Id. at 256-57. The Government also argued that CFP "'eventually
became associated with a national gang."' Id. at 257. The court, again, did not find
substantial evidence that CFP's dealings ever crossed state lines. Id.
121 Id. at 258 ("[A] corpse cannot shop, after all.").
122 Id. at 257-58.




presented was sufficient to establish a de minimis effect on interstate
commerce or the Sixth Circuit would not have carved out a special standard
for non-economic enterprises. From the Sixth Circuit's perspective then,
the de minimis standard is an extremely low evidentiary threshold.
2. United States v. Nascimento
In contrast, the First Circuit in United States v. Nascimento held that
the normal textual requirements of RICO-the plain "affecting comrrmerce"
language-applied to non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by
individuals associated with non-economic intrastate enterprises. 125 The case
centered on Jackson Nascimento and Stonehurst, a local street gang that
controlled Stonehurst Street in Boston, Massachusetts. 12 6 Nascimento was a
member of Stonehurst, a bitter rival of a similarly local street gang known
as Wendover.1 27 Between 1998 and 2000, a wave of violence transpired
between the two street gangs.128 Members of Stonehurst repeatedly shot
and killed members of Wendover, and members of Wendover retaliated in
an equally violent fashion. 129 In 2004, thirteen members of Stonehurst,
including Nascimento, were charged with violating RICO. 3 °  The
indictment alleged that Stonehurst's primary purpose was to shoot and kill
those individuals associated with Wendover.131 There was no evidence that
Stonehurst or its members participated in any other criminal activity.1
32
Stonehurst did not traffic drugs, extort, rob, or otherwise engage in crimes
of a commercial nature. 33 Nascimento was convicted of racketeering and
racketeering conspiracy in violation of RICO.134 The jury concluded that he
shot one rival gang member and conspired to kill others. 35 Nascimento
appealed.
3 6
In this case, the First Circuit reluctantly diverged from the Sixth
Circuit's holding in Waucaush.137  The court ruled that RICO's
jurisdictional element required only a de minimis nexus to interstate







132 Id. at 30-31.
133 Id. at 30 n.1.
134 Id. at 31.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 30.
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commerce even where the defendant was involved with a non-economic
intrastate enterprise.' 38 In reaching its conclusion, the court dispatched of
the Sixth Circuit's reasoning set forth in Waucaush, analyzed RICO under
Raich,139 and determined, based on the evidence before it, that Stonehurst
had a de minimis effect on interstate commerce.
140
Nascimento urged the court to adopt the Sixth Circuit's evidentiary
standard for RICO's jurisdictional element. 141  In Waucaush, the Sixth
Circuit held that the Government must demonstrate substantial effects on
interstate commerce in cases involving non-economic racketeering activity
and a non-economic intrastate enterprise.142  After an analysis of the
statute's text and legislative history, the First Circuit found no reason to
follow Waucaush.143  Correctly, the court noted that the Sixth Circuit
improperly employed the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. 44  The
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, it wrote, does not permit the courts to
interpret a statute in such a way that "give[s] alternative meanings to
statutory phrases in cases in which a statute's application might be
constitutionally dubious."'145 To the contrary, when, after a proper textual
analysis, a statute is susceptible to more than one construction, the doctrine
138 Id. at 37.
"9 See infra Part IV.B.
141 Id. at 38.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 37.
143 Id. at 38.
144 Id.
45 Id. (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 384 (2005)). One commentator
supporting the Sixth Circuit's application of the constitutional avoidance doctrine in
Waucaush wrote that "[r]equiring a substantial effect for non-economic enterprises does not
render the statute a chameleon; it simply says that enterprises that fall outside the spirit of the
Act must meet a higher threshold to qualify under the language of the Act." Frank
D'Angelo, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs and the Outer Limits of RICO's "Affecting
Commerce" Requirement, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2075, 2110 (2008) (citation omitted). To the
contrary, this statement describes perfectly a chameleonic statute. Under this posited regime
of statutory interpretation, a particularized statutory interpretation might include within that
statute's reach circumstances that would otherwise be excluded, or exclude from that
statute's reach circumstances that would otherwise be included.
A statute must be interpreted evenly and uniformly; it either applies or it does not. See
Clark, 543 U.S. at 383-84. To satisfy RICO's jurisdictional element, Waucaush required a
de minimis effect on interstate commerce when the enterprise at issue engaged in economic
activity; and it required a substantial effect on interstate commerce when the enterprise at
issue did not engage in economic activity. Waucaush v. United States, 380 F.3d 251, 258
(6th Cir. 2004). The defendant dictated RICO's interpretation and application. See id. This
method of statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the constitutional avoidance doctrine.
See Clark, 543 U.S. at 383-84. It would have been proper if the Sixth Circuit required a
substantial effect on interstate commerce in every RICO case. See id. The existing
dichotomy, though, is problematic.
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of constitutional avoidance exists to evoke the construction that avoids a
constitutional question.146 That construction is then applied evenly in every
circumstance."' The First Circuit had already defined RICO's
jurisdictional element as requiring only a de minimis effect on interstate
commerce. 48 Bound by precedent, it could not now alter that definition.
149
Therefore, RICO required only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce
for non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by an individual
associated with a non-economic intrastate enterprise.
150
The First Circuit then considered whether the evidence presented at
trial was sufficient to establish Stonehurst's de minimis effect on interstate
commerce. 151 The record indicated that a member of Stonehurst traveled
out of state to purchase one of the nine firearms shared by others in the
gang.1 52 Crossing state lines to make a commercial transaction is an activity
encompassed by the commerce power. 5 3 This evidence satisfied RICO's
de minimis standard.1 54 The fact that the other weapons used by Stonehurst
had traveled through interstate commerce, the fact that one of the shootings
perpetrated by Stonehurst had temporarily, though insignificantly, closed a
business engaged in interstate commerce, and the fact that members of the
gang used cell phones to communicate only bolstered the court's
position. 155
D. HIGHER THRESHOLD FOR THE DE MINIMIS STANDARD
Currently, RICO's jurisdictional hook is an element of any substantive
RICO prosecution 156 and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in each
case.1 57  The federal government can establish a sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce by presenting evidence regarding the defendant's
enterprise or the defendant's individual acts of racketeering.1 58  If the
146 Clark, 543 U.S. at 384.
147 Id. at 383.
148 Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 39.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 37.
151 The court employed heightened scrutiny in making this determination because
Stonehurst was not engaged in activity of an economic nature. Id. at 43.




156 See, e.g., United States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1991).
157 See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 52 F. App'x 846, 847 (7th Cir. 2002).
158 See United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 671-72 (1995) (finding the defendant's
gold mine, the alleged RICO enterprise, sufficiently engaged in interstate commerce because
it employed individuals from other states and used supplies that traveled through interstate
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Government seeks to establish a sufficient nexus between interstate
commerce and the defendant's enterprise, it can do so in one of two
ways. 159 First, it can present evidence demonstrating that the defendant's
enterprise was engaged in interstate commerce.160  To be considered
"engaged in interstate commerce," the enterprise itself must be "'directly
engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services
in interstate commerce.' '1 61 The Government can also present evidence
demonstrating that the enterprise's activities affected interstate
commerce. 162  Alternatively, the Government can present evidence that
establishes a sufficient nexus between interstate commerce and the
defendant's individual racketeering or predicate acts.1 63 The Government is
not required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that both the enterprise and
the individual acts of racketeering affected interstate commerce.164
The Supreme Court has addressed RICO's jurisdictional element only
once, in United States v. Robertson, decided five days after Lopez.' 6' The
Court concluded that the defendant's enterprise had engaged in interstate
commerce. 16 6  It did not, therefore, consider whether the enterprise's
activities met, or needed to meet, the requirement of substantially affecting
interstate commerce to satisfy RICO's jurisdictional element.1 67  The
Supreme Court has not provided the lower federal courts with any
additional guidance on whether to apply the affecting interstate commerce
standard or the substantially affecting interstate commerce standard.
Historically, the Government needed to provide evidence sufficient to
establish only a de minimis nexus between interstate commerce and the
commerce); United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that
defendants burned several houses that, though intrastate, were sufficiently involved in
interstate commerce); United States v. Juvenile Male, 118 F.3d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1997)
(finding that defendants robbed several Subway restaurants and that those robberies
sufficiently affected interstate commerce).
159 Robertson, 514 U.S. at 671-72.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 672 (quoting United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283
(1975)).
162 Id. at 671; see United States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529, 537 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that
the activities of an Ohio-based RICO enterprise sufficiently affected interstate commerce
because the enterprise purchased Pennsylvania lottery tickets).
163 Bagley et al., supra note 33, at 918.
164 Id.
165 Robertson, 514 U.S. 669.
166 Id. at 671-72.
167 Id. The Court noted that "the 'affecting commerce' test was developed.., to define
the extent of Congress' power over purely intrastate commercial activities that nonetheless
have substantial interstate effects." Id. at 671.
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defendant's enterprise or individual predicate acts.168 Since United States v.
Lopez, countless defendants have argued that in order to prove RICO's
jurisdictional element, the Government must demonstrate that the
defendant's enterprise or individual racketeering acts had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.169 The federal circuit courts have almost
uniformly rejected this proposition. 170 Many 17 have relied on the principle
set forth by the Supreme Court in a footnote in Maryland v. Wirtz:
"[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to
commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under
that statute is of no consequence."1 72 Because RICO is a general regulatory
scheme that bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce, the de
minimis economic character of the individual instances of racketeering or an
enterprise's activities is of no consequence. 
1 3
In most RICO prosecutions, ample evidence exists to establish a de
minimis nexus between interstate commerce and either the enterprise or the
individual predicate acts. Often, the Government can even demonstrate that
the defendant's enterprise or individual predicate acts had substantial
effects on interstate commerce. Many of the enterprises involved in RICO
prosecutions engage in economic activity or participate in activities that
affect interstate commerce. 7 4 They purchase large quantities of goods that
have traveled through interstate commerce or employ service providers that
originate out of state. 175 Many also perpetrate crimes that are commercial in
168 See United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The effect on
commerce is an essential element of a RICO violation, but the required nexus need not be
great. A minimal effect on interstate commerce satisfies this jurisdictional element.");
United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 233 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d
564, 573 (9th Cir. 1979).
169 See, e.g., United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2002).
170 See United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290 (2005); Marino, 277 F.3d 11; United
States v. Riddle, 249 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765 (4th Cir.
1998); United States v. Torres, 129 F.3d 710 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Juvenile Male,
118 F.3d 1344 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Maloney, 71 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995).
171 See, e.g., Maloney, 71 F.3d at 663.
172 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968).
173 United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2007); see also United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) ("Section 922(q) is not an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity .... It cannot, therefore be sustained under our cases
upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.");
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (holding a federal law criminalizing loan
sharking constitutional as applied to individual instance of intrastate loan sharking).
174 United States v. Robertson, 514 U.S. 669, 670 (1995) (entering business contract with
individual out of state, investing in facilities out of state, and conducting business operations
out of state constitute being engaged in interstate commerce).
175 See, e.g., id. at 669.
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nature. They deal drugs, launder money, rob, extort, or gamble. 76 These
activities affect interstate commerce. Additionally, many enterprises are
multi-state in membership.'77  Their communications and regularly
conducted business cross state lines, affecting interstate commerce in the
process. 178  Under these circumstances and by virtue of the aggregation
principle, the de minimis standard does not necessarily offend the principles
set forth in Lopez and Morrison.
A de minimis nexus to interstate commerce is an evidentiary standard
not unique to RICO. It is shared by many other federal criminal laws.
179
With respect to these statutes, the standard has been upheld against the
same type of Lopez and Morrison challenges that have been levied against
RICO. 180 However, in some cases the federal courts have retreated from the
de minimis standard's strict application. 181 In United States v. Wang, the
Sixth Circuit recognized the traditionally low threshold required by the de
minimis standard in Hobbs Act cases. 182 The Hobbs Act states: "[W]hoever
in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce ... by robbery
or extortion.., shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
twenty years, or both.' 83 When an enumerated offense is directed at a
176 See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza, 52 F. App'x 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding a
RICO enterprise where defendant's gang was involved in marijuana trafficking).
177 See, e.g., United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 991 (8th Cir. 2004) (involving a
defendant who was a member of a Minnesota unit of a larger, national gang based in
California).
178 See Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 45 ("[Cirossing state lines for purpose of engaging in a
commercial transaction is a paradigmatic example of an activity that falls within the compass
of the commerce power.").
179 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2006); see also Bradley,
supra note 16, at 592-610
180 United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 899, 901-04 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting Lopez and
Morrison challenges to de minimis standard applied under the Hobbs Act, and citing like
decisions made by other federal circuits).
181 Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857 (2000); United States v. Davis, 473 F.3d
680, 682 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2000)); see
also, e.g., Bradley, supra note 16, at 592-8 (arguing that robbery or extortion of private
individuals not in the course of business should not be subject to federal jurisdiction); Kelly
D. Miller, Recent Development, The Hobbs Act, The Interstate Commerce Clause, and
United States v. McFarland: The Irrational Aggregation of Independent Local Robberies to
Sustain Federal Convictions, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1761, 1773-74 (2002) (arguing that the
speculative, miniscule and future impact of local robberies on interstate commerce does not
sufficiently affect interstate commerce and should not qualify for federal jurisdiction under
the Hobbs Act); Thomas Heyward Carter, III, Note, The Devil in U.S. v. Jones: Church
Burnings, Federalism, and a New Look at the Hobbs Act, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1461,
1490-1500 (2002) (noting, and arguing for the consistent avoidance of, the constitutional
questions raised by an expansive reading of the Federal Arson Act and the Hobbs Act).
182 Wang, 222 F.3d at 237.
18 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
2009]
BRIAN NISBET
business establishment, the court observed that the Government need only
demonstrate a realistic probability that the offense had an effect on
interstate commerce.184  The court recognized, though, that when the
criminal act is directed at a private citizen, the required showing is of a
different order.1 85 For example, the robbery of a private citizen that causes
only a speculative effect on interstate commerce will not satisfy the de
minimis standard.1 86 In Wang, the defendants robbed two private citizens of
$4,200 in their home.1 87  The court refused to "pile inference upon
inference" to establish an effect on interstate commerce, and reversed the
defendant's conviction, finding no violation of the Hobbs Act.
88
"[U]pholding federal jurisdiction over Wang's offense
would... acknowledge a general federal police power with respect to the
crimes of robbery and extortion.1 89
The Federal Arson Act also contains a jurisdictional element that is
similar to RICO's. It has, on occasion, been narrowly construed. In Jones
v. United States,' 90 the Supreme Court employed tools of statutory
construction to limit the statute's reach. Under the Federal Arson Act, it is
a crime to damage or destroy "by means of fire or an explosive... property
used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate
or foreign commerce."1 91  The Supreme Court recognized that with an
expansive reading of the statute's jurisdictional element, "hardly a building
in the land would fall outside the federal statute's domain."' 92  A
construction of this sort would render traditionally local criminal conduct,
arson, a matter for federal enforcement.193 The Court called on the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance and narrowly construed the Federal Arson Act
to circumvent this constitutionally dubious conclusion. The majority keyed
in on the term used, and held that the statute applied to only those buildings
that were actively employed in commercial purposes.
194
Expansive readings of the Hobbs Act and the Federal Arson Act raise
troubling constitutional questions that are analogous to those raised by an
expansive reading of RICO. All three statutes regulate certain criminal
114 Wang, 222 F.3d at 237.
"' Id. at 238.
186 Id. at 239.
"' Id. at 241.
188 Id. at 239-40 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
189 Id.
190 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
191 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2006).
192 Jones, 529 U.S. at 857.
"' Id. at 858.
194 Id. at 855.
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conduct for its effects on interstate commerce and not for the criminal
conduct per se. All three contain a jurisdictional element that links the
regulated criminal conduct to interstate commerce. All three, when
liberally construed, are sweeping and pervasive in the individuals,
enterprises, and acts they regulate. If their jurisdictional element is
expansively read, all three have the potential to blur the line between what
is truly local and what is truly national, and to essentially regulate
traditionally local criminal conduct for its incidental effects on interstate
commerce. In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court expressly rejected
this use of Congress's commerce power.
As with the Hobbs Act and the Federal Arson Act, the federal courts
should interpret RICO's jurisdictional element to reconcile the statute's text
with the enumerated nature of Congress's commerce power. While it
would be a jurisprudential sea change to require that the government prove
substantial effects on interstate commerce to prosecute a RICO violation,
the federal courts, as they have with the Hobbs Act and the Federal Arson
Act, should exercise some restraint in analyzing RICO's jurisdictional
element.
195
Since RICO's jurisdictional element is an evidentiary standard, this
restraint must manifest in an evidentiary threshold. In every case, the
federal courts should hold the state to a higher evidentiary threshold than
what has traditionally satisfied the de minimis standard. The de minimis
standard should have some teeth. When the enterprise or individual acts of
racketeering have only a potential or speculative affect on interstate
commerce, RICO's jurisdictional element should not be satisfied., 96  In
other words, evidence showing only violent crime, cell phone use, email
use, or a small number of shared weapons or vehicles should be insufficient
to establish a de minimis connection to interstate commerce. The stricter de
minimis standard will excise from RICO's reach those cases that involve
195 The First Circuit hinted at the need for exercising some caution. United States v.
Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Because Stonehurst had not been engaged in
racketeering activity of an economic nature, we employ heightened scrutiny throughout this
examination."). The First Circuit also noted the constitutional questions that might arise
from an expansive reading of RICO's jurisdictional element. Id. at 41 ("We share
appellants' concern that the government's theory here, aggressively pursued, might threaten
to trespass on an area of traditional state concern."); see also United States v. McFarland,
311 F.3d 376, 409 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (discussing the need for a "meaningful and
rational basis for aggregation" when the criminal activity suppressed by federal statute is
essentially local violent crime).
196 This incidental effects standard has received support from the Ninth Circuit. Musick
v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990) ("That is to say, RICO jurisdiction ends where
local activities have incidental effects on interstate commerce, exactly at the point where
Sherman Act jurisdiction ends.").
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defendants who commit non-economic racketeering activity on behalf of
non-economic intrastate enterprises without requiring proof of a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Moreover, it does not resemble the
misapprehension of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance employed in
Waucaush, as it would apply evenly in every circumstance.
IV. RICO AND THE REGULATORY NET
A. GONZALES V. RAICH
The extrapolation by lower courts of the Supreme Court's holding in
Gonzales v. Raich may undermine the import of RICO's jurisdictional
element. 97 In Raich, the Supreme Court held that Congress may regulate
any intrastate activity that is rationally included within, and an essential part
of, a larger and valid regulatory scheme.1 98  In so doing, the Court
suggested that Congress need not legislate with a jurisdictional element. 99
It implied that Congress may regulate an intrastate activity even where an
individual instance would not otherwise satisfy a preexisting jurisdictional
element.
200
Raich concerned the Controlled Substances Abuse Act (CSA), a
federal statute that criminalized the manufacture, distribution, or possession
of marijuana.20' The CSA did not contain a jurisdictional element.02 The
respondents conceded that the CSA was facially valid, but argued that its
blanket prohibition exceeded Congress's commerce power as applied to the
intrastate manufacture and possession of medicinal marijuana pursuant to
state law.203 The Court rejected their position.0 4
197 See Stuckey, supra note 15, at 2126-27 ("Even if Congress chooses to utilize the
Raich net when drafting statutes from this point forward, it has already cast its power using a
jurisdictional hook in a significant number of statutes. Does Raich permit courts to disregard
the case-specific hooks and use the Raich net to catch intrastate and interstate activity alike,
regardless of whether the regulated activities would be 'keepers' using solely a hook? Or
should the CSA in Raich be distinguished from statutes containing jurisdictional elements,
thereby requiring courts to ignore the Raich principle when a jurisdictional hook is present?
Several courts of appeals have already confronted these questions (explicitly or implicitly)
and approached the issue in different ways, and the Supreme Court has vacated and
remanded at least two cases involving as-applied challenges to jurisdictional elements for
review in light of Raich." (footnote omitted)).
198 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26-27 (2005).
199 Stuckey, supra note 15, at 2102.
200 Id. at 2104.
20' Raich, 545 U.S. at 14.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 15.
204 Id. at 24.
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The Court assessed whether Congress had exceeded its authority under
the Commerce Clause as applied to the facts of the case. The majority
stressed that it need not determine whether respondents' activities, when
taken in the aggregate, substantially affected interstate commerce in fact,
but only whether a rational basis existed for so concluding.2 °5 The Court
noted that the de minimis character of individual instances arising under a
general regulatory scheme is of no consequence so long as the general
regulatory scheme bears a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.20 6
Drawing from its holding in Wickard v. Filburn, the Court reiterated that
Congress can regulate a purely intrastate activity that is not itself
"commercial" or produced for sale, if failure to do so "would undercut the
regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.,
20 7
In reaching its decision, the Court focused on a primary purpose of the
CSA, to effectively control the nationwide supply and demand of
marijuana. 28 According to the court, "the regulation [was] squarely within
Congress's commerce power because production of the commodity meant
for home consumption.., has a substantial effect on supply and demand in
the national market for that commodity., 20 9 As such, the Court believed
that Congress had a rational basis for incorporating the intrastate
manufacture and possession of marijuana in the CSA.210
Respondents supported their contrary position-that the intrastate
manufacture and possession of medicinal marijuana was a separate and
distinct class of activity, isolated from the interstate market by state law and
state enforcement, and not an essential part of the larger regulatory
21 1_ 212scheme -with arguments that relied heavily on Lopez and Morrison.
The Court quickly distinguished those cases because they involved facial
challenges to the constitutionality of two federal statutes.213 The majority
also highlighted key differences between the CSA and the regulations in
Lopez and Morrison.214  Unlike the isolated prohibition set forth in
§ 922(q)(1)(A) of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, regulating marijuana is
205 Id. at 22.
206 Id. at 17.
207 Id. at 18 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942)).
208 The Court analogized the purpose and factual circumstance of the CSA to the statute
regulating wheat that was at issue in Wickard v. Filburn. Id. at 19 (citing Wickard, 317 U.S.
11).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 22.
211 Id. at 30.
212 Id. at 23.
213 id.
214 Id. at 24.
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one of the many essential parts of the CSA's larger regulation of drug-
related economic activity.215 The larger regulatory scheme would be
undercut unless the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana
were regulated. 16 As opposed to § 13981 of the Violence Against Women
Act, the CSA regulates a quintessentially economic activity.1 7 Lopez and
Morrison shed no doubt on the constitutionality of the CSA.218  After
discussing the characteristics of the respondents' purported class of activity,
the majority had no difficulty in concluding that it was rationally included
within, and an essential part of, a larger regulatory scheme.21 9
In dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the Court's decision for
allowing Congress to set the terms of constitutional debate through strategic
legislative design.220 The majority's decision suggests that Congress could
regulate local activity without impunity, so long as it did so with an
ambitious, all-encompassing federal regulation.22 Any meaningful limit on
the commerce power is removed when Congress is permitted to package
regulation of local activity in larger regulatory schemes. 222  Justice
O'Connor argued that such a holding reduces Lopez to nothing more than a
drafting guide.223
B. RAICH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RICO
Because the CSA did not contain a jurisdictional element, federal
courts have wrestled with how Raich's principles apply, if at all, to statutes
that do.224 Generally, the federal courts have applied Raich with varying
deference.225 In some cases, federal courts have upheld the constitutionality
of a particular statute as applied to an individual instance of the regulated
activity regardless of its effects on interstate commerce. 26  The
215 Id.
216 See id. at 24.
217 Id. at 25.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 26-27. The characteristics of the respondents' purported class and the Court's
analysis of them are discussed infra at Part IV.C.3.
220 Id. at 46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221 Id. at 45.
222 id.
223 Id. at 46.
224 Stuckey, supra note 15, at 2104.
225 Id.
226 The Eleventh, Tenth, Ninth, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits have applied Gonzales to cases
involving the Child Pornography Prevention Act. Stuckey, supra note 15, at 2128-30. This
Act prohibits the possession of child pornography that has "been mailed, or shipped or
transported in interstate" commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2006). Each Circuit held that
Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the regulation of intrastate possession of
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227
jurisdictional element is rendered inconsequential and irrelevant. In a
RICO context, this might mean that non-economic racketeering activity
perpetrated by individuals associated with non-economic intrastate
enterprises would violate RICO regardless of whether the racketeering
activity or the enterprise had at least a de minimis affect on interstate
commerce. In the least, it might completely gut any as-applied
constitutional challenge.
The First Circuit is the only federal circuit court to analyze RICO
under Raich.2  In United States v. Nascimento, Nascimento asserted that
RICO as applied to non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by an
individual associated with a non-economic intrastate enterprise was
unconstitutional.22 9 The First Circuit rejected his claim. 230 The court held
that a general regulatory statute will be sustained if the statute deals
rationally with a class of activity that has a substantial relationship to
interstate commerce.231 It maintained that so long as the class of activity
was within the reach of the federal government, it had no power to isolate
and exclude individual instances of the class.232 The court then noted that
"'Congress's power to criminalize... conduct pursuant to the Commerce
Clause turns on the economic nature of the class of conduct defined in the
statute rather than the economic facts . . . of a single case."
233
The court employed the methodology of Raich and focused its analysis
on the class of activity that RICO regulates.234 The First Circuit found
racketeering activity to be sufficiently economic in nature because, as a
general matter, it "is based largely on greed. 235 It was, therefore, a wholly
legitimate target of Congressional legislation. 36 As such, individual
instances of racketeering activity, even those that are intrastate or of non-
child pornography was an essential part of the statute's comprehensive scheme to eliminate
the interstate market for child pornography. Stuckey, supra note 15, at 2128-30. These
decisions have rendered the Act's jurisdictional element inconsequential and irrelevant. Id.
It did not matter that the individual instance of child pornography possession failed to meet
the statute's jurisdictional element. Id.
227 Stuckey, supra note 15, at 2128-30.
228 A search of LexisNexis for "Gonzales v. Raich" and "racketeer influenced" in the
federal circuit courts returned only United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
229 Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 40.
230 Id. at 43.
231 Stuckey, supra note 15, at 2128-30.
232 Id.
233 Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42 (quoting United States v. Morales-de Jesus, 372 F.3d 6,
18 (1st Cir. 2004) (omissions in original)).
234 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005).




economic character, cannot be excised from RICO's purview. 237 The First
Circuit deferred to "Congress's rational judgment, as part of its effort to
crack down on racketeering enterprises, to enact a statute that targeted
organized violence" because organized violence is so obviously tied to
racketeering activity.2 38 It held that applying RICO to racketeering activity
predicated on non-economic crime did not offend the Commerce Clause.239
C. NO RATIONAL BASIS FOR CONGRESS TO INCORPORATE
The First Circuit erred in Nascimento when it held that Raich governed
RICO in any as-applied constitutional challenge.24° It found that regulating
non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by individuals associated
with non-economic intrastate enterprises was an essential part of RICO's
larger regulatory scheme and that Congress had a rational basis for so




240 The First Circuit did not, though, explicitly discount or undercut RICO's
jurisdictional element. It still determined whether the Government had proved that element
of the offense. Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 43-45.
241 According to one critique, the First Circuit failed to fully appreciate RICO's
jurisdictional element as evidence of Congressional intent. Recent Case, United States v.
Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25 (lst Cir. 2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 1961, 1964 (2008). RICO's
jurisdictional element demonstrates that Congress did not intend to regulate racketeering
activity comprehensively. Id. The State must prove, as an element of the offense, the
jurisdictional element in a substantive RICO charge. Id. Constitutional regulation of
racketeering activity, therefore, is ensured through case-by-case inquiry. Id. Racketeering
activity that does not meet RICO's jurisdictional element is removed from the statute's
regulatory scheme without undercutting it. Id. Thus, Gonzales should never apply to RICO.
Id. This critique is sound.
For a version of this logic as applied to the Hobbs Act, see United States v. Parkes, 497
F.3d 220, 230 (2d Cir. 2007) ("We now reject the proposition ... that findings recited by
Congress in the CSA, dispense with the need for a jury finding that each element of the
Hobbs Act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This proposition conflates distinct
inquiries. Under the CSA, an effect on interstate commerce is not an element; so the inquiry
for the Court was the sufficiency of findings by Congress to support that legislative act.
Under the Hobbs Act, an effect on interstate commerce is an element of the offense; so the
inquiry for this Court is the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury finding on that point.").
Whether it is ultimately persuasive, though, may depend on one's frame and analytical
point of origin. The "affecting commerce" language has been interpreted as a "jurisdictional
term of art that indicates a Congressional intent to assert its full Commerce Clause power."
United States v. Carter, 981 F.2d 645, 647 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563, 571 (1977)). With the "affecting commerce" language employed in
RICO, one might conclude that Congress intended to regulate racketeering activity with its
full Commerce Clause power. One might conclude that Congress, exploiting its full
Commerce Clause power, intended to regulate RICO as comprehensively as it intended to
regulate marijuana. Further, as evidenced by the First Circuit, applying Gonzales to RICO
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between RICO and the statute at issue in Raich, and greatly underestimated
the importance of these distinctions.242
1. Commodity Versus Conduct
In Raich, the CSA regulated a fungible commodity.243 The First
Circuit recognized this factual distinction, but refused to accord it
"decretory significance., 244 A close reading of Raich, however, reveals that
it was exactly the characteristics of a fungible commodity that, in the
Supreme Court's opinion, provided Congress with the rational basis to
reach its conclusion about the CSA's breadth.
The CSA controlled the interstate market for a fungible commodity,
245marijuana. The Court was troubled by the apparent impact that home-
grown medicinal marijuana would have on the drug's nationwide supply
and demand.246 The majority was also bothered by the ease with which
intrastate medicinal marijuana could find its way into the stream of
247interstate commerce. The Court believed that intrastate medicinal
marijuana would never be more than a moment from interstate
commerce. 2 4 8 With marijuana's high street demand, any intrastate stash
could be effortlessly drawn out and injected into the flow of interstate
commerce.
249
RICO controls the figurative interstate market for racketeering activity.
Racketeering activity, however, is not a fungible commodity-it is an
action or behavior. The interstate market for racketeering activity is not
like the interstate market for marijuana. The same market concerns,
pressures, demands, and exchanges do not exist. Racketeering activity is
transactional and finite. Unlike marijuana, intrastate racketeering activity
cannot be resold on the interstate market. It cannot be easily drawn out and
and maintaining the jurisdictional hook as an element of the offense are not mutually
exclusive. The jurisdictional element can be viewed as a limit on Raich, and not a
dispositive impediment to the application of its principles. In other words, though Congress,
under Raich, may constitutionally regulate non-economic "racketeering activity" perpetrated
by an individual associated with a non-economic, intrastate enterprise, the State must still
prove beyond a reasonable doubt a minimal effect on interstate commerce to obtain a
conviction.
242 Though he relies more heavily on the Court's definition of economic activity, Mr.
D'Angelo and I ultimately reach the same conclusion on this issue.
243 Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 42.
244 Id.
245 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
246 Id.
247 See id. at 25-31.
248 See id.
249 Id. at 19.
2009]
BRIAN NISBET
injected into the stream of interstate commerce and, as opposed to a
nondescript fungible commodity, it is never a thin veil away from the flow
of interstate commerce.
2. Purpose and Enforcement
The Court in Raich was troubled by the difficulty in determining the
intended purposes and origins of two quantities of the same fungible
commodity.2 50 Functionally, medicinal marijuana is the same as marijuana
intended for recreational use.251 Medicinal marijuana grown locally is the
same as recreational marijuana grown out of state. Administratively, it is
virtually impossible to quickly distinguish one from the other.252
It would not, however, be difficult for law enforcement to determine
the purposes and origins of two instances of racketeering activity.
Individual instances of racketeering activity are sufficiently distinct. Non-
economic violent racketeering activity differs from racketeering activity
predicated on commercial crime. Racketeering activity perpetrated in
furtherance of a non-economic intrastate enterprise is different from
racketeering activity perpetrated in furtherance of an economic interstate
enterprise. One cannot be mistaken for the other. Additionally, RICO was
designed to help federal prosecutors put forth a coordinated effort against
enterprise criminality.253  The multi-jurisdictional nature of interstate
racketeering activity made it difficult for state officials to prosecute such
conduct.254 State officials, though, have no problem prosecuting those
defendants who are associated with non-economic intrastate enterprises and
who commit non-economic violent racketeering activity. Most states, in
fact, have enacted their own versions of RICO to address this
specifically.255
3. Separate and Distinct Class ofActivity
In determining constitutionality, the First Circuit found that the
majority in Raich "emphasized that it [was] the 'class of activity' that [was]
250 Id. at 22.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 22, 32.
253 See Lynch, supra note 47, at 923 ("Such multi-state activity may be difficult to
prosecute efficiently under conventional doctrines of criminal law and procedure.
Substantive criminal acts may be committed in a variety of jurisdictions, making it
impossible to join all related transactions in the same venue.").
254 Id.
255 JOHN E. FLOYD, RICO STATE BY STATE: A GUIDE TO LITIGATION UNDER THE STATE
RACKETEERING STATUTES (1998).
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relevant., 256 This is not entirely accurate, however. The majority in Raich
often referred to an economic "class of activity., 257 The Supreme Court
defined economic as dealing with the production, distribution, or
consumption of a commodity.258  The CSA made it unlawful to
manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any of the enumerated
controlled substances, including marijuana. 259 The statute was exclusively
economic in nature.26° It regulated exclusively an economic "class of
activity"; and, thus, Congress had the power to regulate purely local
instances of that activity.
261
RICO, on the other hand, does not exclusively address an economic
class of activity. Racketeering activity is considered economic because it
can be defined by crimes of a commercial nature. Because it is so defined,
racketeering activity, as a class of activity, substantially affects interstate
commerce. However, racketeering activity is not consumed by the
production, distribution, and consumption of a commodity. It is not of the
same economic nature as, for example, marijuana, and it does not have
substantial effects on interstate commerce in the same economic way as
does the production, distribution, and consumption of marijuana.
Moreover, racketeering activity, as a class of activity, can be entirely non-
economic. It can consist of entirely non-economic violent crime. This
should give federal courts some pause when analogizing the CSA to RICO.
Otherwise, Lopez and Morrison melt into the strategic drafting guide that so
greatly concerned Justice O'Connor's dissent in Raich. So long as
Congress defined the regulated class of activity to be or include some
activity that was commercial in nature, Congress could regulate all
instances of local violent crime.
For the reasons already mentioned, non-economic racketeering activity
perpetrated by an individual associated with a non-economic intrastate
enterprise is compellingly separate and distinct from the economic class of
activity regulated by RICO. This fact distinguishes non-economic intrastate
racketeering activity from the intrastate loan sharking discussed in Perez v.
United States.262 Loan sharking can only be commercial in nature.263 There
is no form of loan sharking that involves only non-economic violent
256 United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2007).
257 Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-27.
258 Id. at 26.
259 Id. at 24.
260 Id. at 26.
261 Id. at 17.
262 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
263 Id. at 147.
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26 265crime.264 It must, by definition, include an extortionate credit transaction.
Individual instances of intrastate loan sharking are no different in character
than the economic class of activity regulated by the federal statute. The
only difference between an individual instance of loan sharking and loan
sharking that substantially affects interstate commerce is scale. Loan
sharking is therefore subject to the aggregation principle; individual
instances of the class cannot be excised as trivial.266
Thus, the regulatory scheme established in RICO would not be
undercut by failing to regulate non-economic intrastate enterprises
perpetrating non-economic violent racketeering activity. Congress had no
rational basis for concluding otherwise. The aforementioned demonstrates
that Raich is distinguishable, and should not govern RICO in an as-applied
constitutional challenge. Alternatively, if Raich is the reigning test of
constitutionality, then RICO as applied to individuals who commit non-
economic racketeering activity on behalf of non-economic intrastate
enterprises is unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION
In Waucaush v. United States and United States v. Nascimento, the
Sixth and First Circuits Courts of Appeal, respectively, examined the
jurisdictional element of § 1962(c) of RICO. 2 67 The Sixth Circuit held that
despite the statute's text, non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by
individuals associated with non-economic intrastate enterprises must
substantially affect interstate commerce to violate RICO. 268  The First
Circuit diverged from that opinion and held that non-economic racketeering
activity perpetrated by individuals associated with non-economic intrastate
enterprises must only minimally affect interstate commerce to violate
RICO. 26 9 Traditionally, the de minimis standard is a very low evidentiary
threshold.
Though the majority of circuits agree with the First Circuit, the federal
courts should exercise some restraint when applying the de minimis
standard in light of the principles set forth in Lopez and Morrison. A rigid
application of the de minimis standard in this type of RICO case raises
several constitutional concerns. The federal courts therefore should require
more than a speculative or incidental effect on interstate commerce, such
264 Id. at 148.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 154-55.
267 United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2007); Waucaush v. United
States, 380 F.3d 251, 256-57 (6th Cir. 2004).
268 Waucaush, 380 F.3d at 256-57.
269 Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 38.
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that non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by individuals
associated with non-economic intrastate enterprises will not fall under
RICO's purview.
As evidenced by the First Circuit's holding in Nascimento, the
Supreme Court's holding in Gonzales v. Raich may impact the future
treatment and significance of RICO's jurisdictional element. In Raich, the
Court held that Congress may regulate a purely intrastate activity that is
rationally incorporated into, and an essential part of, a larger regulatory
scheme, regardless of the individual instance's nexus to interstate
commerce.2 70 Though the federal courts have not fully explored this issue,
non-economic racketeering activity perpetrated by individuals associated
with non-economic intrastate enterprises should not be viewed as an
essential part of RICO's larger regulatory net. This type of racketeering
activity is compellingly separate and distinct from the larger economic class
of activity regulated by RICO, and there is no rational basis for Congress to
include it within the statute's reach. The principles set forth in Raich
should not apply, but if they do, RICO as applied to non-economic
racketeering activity perpetrated by individuals associated with non-
economic intrastate enterprises should be held unconstitutional.
270 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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